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L INTRODUCTION 
Like the weather, the topic of direct broadcasting by satellite 
into the home is the subject of a great deal of discussion, but re-
mains something about which one can do very little. In the context 
of today's discussion of "The New Information Order," DBS might 
be defined as an acronym representing those Distressing Broad-
casting Satellites. The distress, perceived in many nations at 
various levels of social, economic or technological development, ap-
pears to be based in large measure on fear or ignorance. The fear 
is unfounded. The ignorance is often self-imposed and is politically 
self-serving. Consequently, the great debate over DBS is a tem-
pest in a vacuum chamber. If the debate is ever concluded, I 
believe its results will have little direct effect on governments or 
institutions in the real world of communication and politics. 
IL REALITIES OF SATELLITES TECHNOLOGIES, 
COSTS AND SYSTEMS 
International communication by satellite has been a demon-
strated reality for twenty years. Since experiments in the early 
1960's, the technological feasibility of international satellite com-
munication has been proven. The Early Bird precursor, Syncom,1 
demonstrated the feasibility of the geostationary satellite, which 
is the mainstay of most major communication satellite systems in 
operation today. Nationally owned domestic communication satel-
lite systems are operating today in the U .S.S.R., Canada, In-
donesia, Japan and the United States.2 Independent domestic 
• The views of the author expressed herein are not to be attributed to any organiza-
tion or entity with which he is now or has been affiliated. I gratefully acknowledge the 
assistance of Jacqueline Spindler in the preparation of this article. 
1. Syncom II, launched by NASA in 1963, rejected the random orbit satellite con-
figuration then in use and established the absolute preferability of the geostationary orbit 
for communication satellite purposes. See Hinchman, The Technological Environment for 
International Communications Law, in THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF COMMUNICATIONS, 26 (E. 
McWhinney ed. 1971). 
2. The Canadian Anik system is discussed infra at note 5. The U.S. system, COMSAT, 
was created by Congress in 1962 (Communications Satellite Act of 1962, 47 U.S.C. § 701 
(1976)) and is discussed in other parts of this Symposium. The U.S.S.R.'s broadcasting ac-
tivities are mentioned infra at note 13. For a discussion of Japan's use of DBS, see Smith 
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systems are also being planned in countries such as India and 
Brazil. Other domestic systems, using internationally owned 
satellites, exist in fifteen or more countries. Jointly owned inter-
national satellite systems are operated or planned by Intelsat, In-
tersputnik, the Arab Satellite Corporation, Inmarsat and the 
European Broadcasting Union.3 Surely, others will emerge. 
Satellite communication, albeit relatively new, is a well-
known and widely practiced technological phenomenon. The tech-
nology possesses enormous economic, social and political potential. 
When and how the technology is used can be important factors 
that influence: (1) economic growth and development; (2) social 
awareness and progress; and (3) political unity and stability within 
a nation, within a region, or among countries with shared 
economic, political, and ethnic interests. 
Before considering why nations have been wrestling for more 
than a decade with determining a policy toward DBS, some of the 
technological, economic and practical realities of DBS should be 
addressed. Broadcast satellites are distinguishable from com-
munication relay satellites in several aspects:4 (1) broadcasting is a 
one-way service, requiring large amounts of power on orbit; (2) 
broadcasting transmitters are large, heavy structures, expensive 
to place in orbit; and (3) broadcasting requires specialized anten-
nae and uses specially reserved and controlled radio frequencies. 
Similar in one aspect to communication relay satellites, broad-
casting satellites are expensive to manufacture. 
Experimental and preoperational broadcasting satellites have 
been built, orbited and successfully demonstrated.5 No informed 
person questions the technological feasibility of DBS. But there 
are some, including me, who doubt the economic feasibility of DBS 
systems. The development, construction, launch, operation and 
control of a single broadcasting satellite today, depending upon 
satellite size and complexity, would cost a least $100 million and 
could cost as much as $200 million, just to place the satellite opera-
and Weigend, Yuri: The First Dedicated Broadcast Satellite in Japan, 2 SATELLITE COM-
MUNICATIONS 23, 29 (1978). 
3. For further discussion of operational systems, see Wigand, Direct Satellite Con-
nection: Definitions and Prospects, 30 J. COM. 140 (1980). 
4. MARTIN, FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS ch. 26 (2d ed. 1977). 
5. The Anik system in Canada and SITE (Satellite Instructional Television Experi-
ment) in India are just two examples. See Wigand, supra note 3; see also Grandi and 
Richeri, Western Europe: The Development of DBS Systems, 30 J. CoM.169 (1980). 
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tionally available, in orbit, with necessary tracking, telemetry and 
control systems in place.6 The cost of the earth station complex, 
which feeds the satellite and the population of receivers (whether 
individual or community), would be added to the cost of the basic 
space segment. The production cost of programming to be broad-
cast through the satellite could be as little as a few thousand 
dollars an hour for static-type displays of weather, temperature, 
barometric readings, wind strength and direction, time, or printed 
news or information formats. Costs could rise to any where from 
tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands of dollars per hour for 
dramatic shows, general entertainment, motion pictures, sports 
events, coverage of natural disasters, important social or political 
events, or educational programming.7 An interested student of 
this subject would do well to study the relevant production costs 
and associated program quality of several experiments conducted 
during the 1970's in the United States, Canada, India and Japan, 
which provide some measure of program production costs.8 These 
costs are generally very high. 
If the technology exists for the manufacture of broadcasting 
satellites and no major new technological breakthroughs are re-
quired, why aren't there more DBS systems in operation? Two 
reasons are the high cost and the attendant risk for those who 
would finance such systems. Another reason is that the satellite 
requires an audience. There is no substantial population of direct 
home receivers in any country in the world today. Marketing 
studies have shown that the cost of a home receiver ranges from 
$200 to $500 or more, in production runs of 50,000 or 100,000 
units.9 To create a population of one million home receivers, an in-
vestment of $200 to $500 million dollars is required for receivers 
alone. If one million such receivers were in the United States to-
day, they would be serve only a small fraction of the households in 
our country. A substantial receiver population will require billions 
6. Pritchard and Kase, Getting Set for Direct Broadcast Satellites, SPECTRUM, April 
1981, at 22. 
7. Id. 
8. See, e.g., ISRO: SATELLITE INSTRUCTIONAL TELEVISION EXPERIMENT: TECHNICAL 
EvALUTATION OF THE GROUND SEGMENT (1977). The total program production costs of this 
one-year, U.S.-India experiment ran well into the billions of dollars. 
9. There are presently several groups, including UPI and SP ACE, offering one-
meter home dishes within this price range. The costs naturally decrease as quantities pro-
duced increase. See Sardella and Degnan, Satellite Broadcasting to Homes, 5 TELECOM· 
MUNICATIONS POLICY 84, 89 (1981). 
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of dollars of new investment in receivers or receiver augmentation 
equipment. 
Japan now has a preoperational DBS system;1° Canada is plan-
ning to introduce DBS in the early 1980's;11 the Comsat Corpora-
tion is seeking authority to introduce DBS in the United States;12 
and the government of the U .S.S.R. continually announces plans to 
provide direct-to-home television13 (a plan discussed since the 
mid-1950's), but reliable information on actual systems in the 
U.S.S.R. is not available. These few systems may be doubled in 
number by 1990. Systems may be introduced for Australia, Brazil, 
and one or two more countries; but I am convinced that DBS will 
be neither attractive nor economically practical in the great ma-
jority of countries in the world. When the contributions of DBS 
technology, potentially consuming billions of dollars, are con-
trasted to benefits from investments in food and agricultural pro-
duction, basic education, transportation, power generation and in-
dustrial capitalization, most responsible governments will 
recognize that an investment in DBS in this century is probably a 
waste of resources. 
A handful of large countries that have populations dispersed 
over large land areas or other geographic features that can be 
overcome by DBS may experiment and invest.14 The results of 
such experiments will not be known for many years, but will prob-
ably be mixed results at best. DBS is struggling to obtain accep-
tance at the national level, and will not be used on a global scale in 
the near future. Few countries will invest millions or even billions 
of dollars to broadcast to non-existing receivers. 
The capacity of a single geostationary satellite to 
simultaneously interconnect and broadcast to as much as forty 
10. N. MATTE, SPACE POLICY AND PROGRAMMES TODAY AND TOMORROW: THE VANISHING 
DUOPOLE 76 (1980). 
11. The Anik system development continues. See COMMUNICATIONS RESEARCH CENTRE. 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATIONS, COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITES: THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE 
(1979). In addition, Canada has operational agreements with the European Space Agency 
(ESA). See Bourely, La Participation due Canada aux Programmes de l'Agence Spatiale 
Europenne, 5 ANNALS OF AIR AND SPACE LAW 363 (1980). 
12. COMSAT Application, 77 F.C.C.2d 564 (1980). 
13. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, July 16, 1976 at 12, col. 5; Mar. 9, 1977, at 12, col. 4. 
14. Some nations which have already benefited from even preliminary programs are 
India (SITE) and Canada. The United States Agency for International Development spon-
sors a Rural Satellite Program which has more than sixty programs in various stages of 
planning and/or operation. See Honig, Some Lessons for the 1999 WARC, 30 J. COM. 48 
(1980). 
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percent of the earth's surface16 is not a blessing to the broadcast 
satellite. Internationally established power flux density limita-
tions on the strength of broadcast satellite radio signals at the 
earth's surface limit the strength with which radio beams may be 
emitted from satellites.16 To conserve power and maintain a 
reasonably uniform signal strength (picture quality) over a large 
area, satellite beam shaping with antenna control techniques that 
are only beginning to be understood and demonstrated are 
necessary. In fact, the engineer wants to limit, as much as possi-
ble, the area to be covered by a satellite broadcast. Separate 
broadcast beams are used for different time zones, island areas or 
groups, and separated national territories.17 These divisions of 
beams are as essential from an engineering standpoint as they are 
convenient from an operational standpoint. A great deal remains 
to be learned about beam shaping and broadcast beam separation. 
There are also unanswered questions about the picture quality 
possible in heavy rain, through dense moist clouds, and in other 
signal propagation configurations.18 For these reasons experimen-
tal and demonstrational systems will continue for some years to 
come. Such trials will cost hundreds of millions of dollars, indepen-
dent of the anticipated all-up operational system costs. 
Thus, a forthright consideration of the techological, economic 
and system aspects of DBS does not make an objective observer 
anxious to seek investment opportunities in DBS. If anything, it 
makes a wise investor wary, unless exceptional circumstances, 
present in only a few countries, suggest economic viability .19 
/IL DBS POLICY AND THE ROLE OF THE 
UNITED NATIONS 
If, in fact, there is validity to this pessimistic outlook for the 
future of "distressing broadcasting satellites," why has there been 
so much press attention and political attention to the prospects of 
introducing this technology on a global basis? The answer is, in 
part, because the concerns predated our understanding of the 
realities. The notion of television broadcasting by satellite to a na-
15. See Wigand, supra note 3. 
16. MARTIN, supra note 4. 
17. Id. See also Pritchard and Kase, supra note 6. 
18. MARTIN, supra note 4. 
19. Such circumstances would include, among others, vastness of distance, sparseness 
of population, ruggedness of terrain, and absence of existing terrestrial systems. 
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tional audience was first discussed in a 1945, in letter to an elec-
tronic magazine in England from noted science fiction writer Ar-
thur C. Clarke, then an obscure former radar technician.20 At that 
time the editors of Wireless World were unable to appreciate the 
author's prescience. 
Concepts often outstrip economic and engineering reality. 
Many fine ideas have fallen under the assault of a structural 
analysis, a materials stress analysis, an economic analysis, or a 
system cost/benefit analysis. In the case of DBS, many proponents 
wanted its socio/political impact to be a global unifier, a social 
stabilizer, an. economic. stimulus, and a benefit to mankind. Thus, 
distressing broadcasting satellities were praised, promoted and 
tried. The experience gained has tempered much of the enthusi-
asm about DBS potential, but this experience has not yet and may 
not ever result in the abandonment of the technology. Because the 
technology was believed to be so important, and because it does 
have a potential global impact, the United Nations Committee on 
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space became interested and decided 
to study the subject. 
Mindful of the evolving technology, the U .N. Committee, 
through the General Assembly, formed a special Working Group 
on Direct Broadcasting Satellites. At the first meeting of that 
group, in 1969, a very fine, time-proven, and valid assessment was 
made of the technical and economic aspects of DBS.21 Then, in four 
succeeding working group sessions held between 1969 and 1974, 
the group began the attempt to design a policy framework within 
which DBS could be established and used.22 
Opinions of group members varied widely. The U .S.S.R. and 
its echoes in the United Nations, along with France and many 
lesser developed countries, contended strongly that the DBS 
technology was fearsome and threatening to national sovereignty, 
cultural integrity and economic stability. 23 In 1963, France proposed 
a ban on broadcasting satellites.24 In 1972, the U.S.S.R. proposed a 
20. Clarke, Extra-terrestrial Relays: Can Rocket Stations Give Worldwide Radio 
Coverage? WIRELESS WORLD, Oct. 1945, at 305. 
21. Report of the Working Group on DBS, U.N. Doc. A/AC./.105/61 (12 Aug. 1969, 2d 
Sess.). 
22. Report of the Working Group on DBS, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/61 (12 Aug. 1969, 2d 
Sess.); U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/83 (25 May 1970, 3d Sess.); U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/117 (22 June 
1973, 4th Sess.); U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/127 (2 Apr. 1974, 5th Sess.). 
23. U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/79 (7 Apr. 1970). 
24. Letter from France to Peaceful Uses of Outer Space Committee, U.N. Doc. 
A/AC.105/cl.WP.7 (20 May, 1963). 
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treaty to regulate the use of television broadcasting satellites25 
and Argentina followed with elaborate proposals of its own for 
control and prohibitions of certain uses of such satellites.26 The 
United States, caught up in the excitement of the time, proposed a 
body of principles to guide nations in the use of broadcasting 
satellites.27 Canada and Sweden emerged as promoters of rationality 
and compromise.28 When the First Committee of the General 
Assembly recorded a vote on a resolution calling for a study for-
mulation of DBS principles as a step toward an eventual conven-
tion to regulate DBS, the United States, denying the need for a 
convention, found itself on the lonely end of a 102 to 1 vote.29 
The U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, the 
Comittee and its suborgans operate by consensus, not by vote. 
Matters are debated until a clear or substantial consensus 
emerges and then, absent objection, a decision is made. Surpris-
ingly, during the past seven or eight years, the allegedly isolated 
United States found it was not alone in its reservations about ab-
solute prohibitions and restrictive controls on the use of DBS. The 
United Kingdom, Belgium, Japan and, after it became a committee 
member, the Federal Republic of Germany voiced concerns in op-
position to the Soviet, French and Third World proposals.3° Clear-
ly, no consensus was available; and as of 1981, no consensus on 
DBS regulation has been reached. There are probably as many ex-
planations for the failure to reach a consensus as there are 
observers. I will offer my views about why we can reach no con-
sensus and conclude with some modest suggestions of a way out of 
the current impasse. 
IV. THE IRRECONCILABLE VIEWS 
In countries where mass media are operated by or are under 
the control of the government, the media are instruments of the 
state.31 The range of control and use of media is widely varied 
25. U.S.S.R. Draft Resolution, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/L.605 (12 Oct. 1972). 
26. DRAFT CONVENTION ON DIRECT BROADCASTING BY SATELLITE, U.N. Doc. 
A/AC.105/134 (5 July 1974). 
27. United States of America Working Paper, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.118 (1979). 
28. Canada-Sweden Working Papers, U.N. Doc. A/C.105/271, Annex I (15 Feb. 1979). 
29. REPORT OF FIRST COMMITTEE, Draft Resolution, U.N. Doc. A/8864 (adopted 9 Nov. 
1972). 
30. See Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Verbatim Record of 170th 
Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/P.U. 170-173 (21June1977). 
31. The list coincides with the list of states demanding establishment of an inter-
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among democratic countries: some have stringent controls; others, 
as in the case of the United States, have only minimal governmental 
control.32 Although we tend to declare loudly the United States' 
committment to freedom of speech and the free flow of informa-
tion, there are obvious examples of information control. The 
classification system for security information,33 various privacy 
laws protecting certain classes of information from exposure or 
publication,34 limitations in law on lewdness, obscenity, racism,35 
"fairness in broadcasting,"36 and a variety of voluntary codes 
which limit freedom of advertisers, television producers, motion 
picture producers are examples. Even industrial secrets are pro-
tected by the courts.37 
Despite the practice of information control that exists to some 
extent in every country, there is a tendency to characterize 
various countries as "controlled" or "open." That classification 
begets debate during which fine and important commonalities are 
clouded or glossed over. The result is that, ultimately, there are 
perceptions of irreconcilable positions. I suspect that much of the 
irreconcilability could be eliminated through frank and unemo-
tional discussion. I believe the main problem in dealing with these 
issues is the emotional polarization of views and incorrect attribu-
tions of positions to various countries, or groups of countries. 
Are France and the United States irreconcilably at odds? Can 
the U .S.S.R. and Wes tern Democracies find no common ground to 
deal with reasonable program content issues? Is there really no 
legitimate, legal basis for the U.S. government to consider possi-
ble constraints on program content? When is the last time you saw 
a cigarette advertised on television? Have you even seen an adver-
tisement for beer in which the beer was actually put into the 
mouth? Have you ever seen a person sitting on a toilet on televi-
sion? Have you ever witnessed coitus on television? Have you 
national broadcasting code, and includes the Soviet bloc countries and many Third World 
nations. 
32. Great Britain and Canada are among those nations having few restraints on the 
media. 
33. Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §35 (1976). 
34. Id. at §605. 
35. Id. at §303. 
36. See Red Lion Broadcasting Company v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), and citations 
therein. 
37. Communications Act supra note 33, at §605. 
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ever seen a Ku Klux Klan rally televised? Is there no censorship 
in American television? 
Objectively considered and unemotionally evaluated, I believe 
that significant common ground can be found to deal with serious 
concerns of many countries on important issues of program con-
tent control. We don't allow all forms of sex, violence, racial 
hatred or propagandistic advertising in our country. Why do Am-
ericans rigidly insist that Russia, France, Argentina and others 
must admit unrestricted and uncontrolled program content? I 
doubt that in the final analysis we want to give foreign govern-
ments the very freedoms we demand that they give us. 
I don't accept the irreconcilability of national positions on pro-
gram content issues. I wish the discussions could be depolarized 
and de-emotionalized. I believe they can be. 
V. SOME NEXT STEPS 
Up to this point I have said very little about the hero in this 
story, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU).38 A 
strange, unsung, even unsuspected hero, to be sure, but none-
theless, a hero. 
A substantial amount of attention of that 154 member-nation 
international organization has been devoted to the technical and 
regulatory aspects of distressing broadcasting satellites. The ITU 
began addressing specific aspects of the broadcasting satellite ser-
vice a decade ago, and considerable additional study and work has 
been done on the subject in the intervening years. In 1983, a 
Regional Administrative Radio Conference will continue that 
work in Region 2, the Americas. 
If all nations now serving on the bloated United Nations Com-
mittee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space would carefully con-
sider the substance, content and implications of the work of recent 
years in the ITU concerning broadcasting satellites, undoubtedly 
a great deal of the apparent distress would dissipate. The U.N. 
Outer Space Committee's Legal Subcommittee could formulate a 
practical and generally acceptable code, voluntary in nature but 
specific in content, that addresses most, if not all, of the concerns 
of states about television broadcasting program content, possibly 
38. See Jacobson, International Institutions for Telecommunications: The ITU's Role, 
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF COMMUNICATIONS 51 (E. McWhinney ed. 1971). 
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applicable to terrestrial and space broadcasting. All of the enforce-
ment mechanisms that are needed to give that code effect with 
regard to satellite broadcasting already exist in ITU regulations.39 
Very little more is needed to solve the DBS problem than some 
goodwill, creative imagination, and frank discussion. Let's get on 
with it! 
VL CON CL US/ON 
As was pointed out at the outset, the conclusion of the DBS 
policy debate will be of little practical effect. No nation is now 
known to be contemplating international broadcasting by satellite. 
I seriously doubt that any nation ever will, except in unique or 
special circumstances that do not involve practical economics. 
Nations now planning to develop and establish national DBS 
systems will proceed regardless of the state of the debate in the 
U.N. It would be neater, tidier, more pleasant if the policy debate 
were to be concluded. I am in favor of early conclusion. But, in the 
final analysis, states will act in their own interests and will give up 
sovereign autonomy only very grudgingly. Selected DBS systems 
will emerge. International broadcasting using satellites is not, in 
my view, a serious prospect or a serious problem. 
39. International Telecommunications Convention, done 25 Oct., 1973, 28 U.S.T. 2495, 
T.I.A.S. No. 8572. 
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